【星岛网讯】美国国务院东亚副助卿柯庆生11日代表美国政府，以极其严厉的字眼批评台湾陈水扁政府的入联公投，并期盼台湾民众发挥智慧，认清入联公投对台湾的伤害。柯庆生于开场白时即表示：“我的演说代表美国政府一致的看法。”
柯庆生（Thomas Christensen）在美台国防工业会议上演讲时，清楚提出上述观点。该会议属于闭门性质，但是美国政府选择全文公开，而且在演说完毕后，立刻提供全文给媒体，同时也刊登于会议主办单位美台商业协会的网站上。
柯庆生说，台海情形不易处理，台湾的领导人如何领航，至关重要，民众的利益能否获得保护，台湾能否在和平与安定的环境中继续繁荣，台湾一切的成就是否将处于台海紧张的风险；甚至冲突之中，“他们的行动是主要角色”。
柯庆生说，美国也同时要求台湾（当局）不走极端，因为，“台湾的安全，与台湾避免挑衅，两者密不可分”，“负责任的台湾领导人，必须预期到大陆可能的红线及反应，避免不必要、没有意义的挑衅”。
柯庆生说，基于这个观点，美国政府近来对陈水扁当局所推动的政策表达关切，“特别是陈水扁当局支持以‘台湾名义加入联合国之公民投票’”。柯庆生表示，美国不反对“公投”，“但是，任何特定的公投，其题目与内容必须考虑”。
柯庆生说，入联公投无助于台湾申请入联，因此每个人都知道，入联公投只是内部政治消费；美国也要重申立场：美国不支持台湾加入以主权国家为会员资格的国际组织，所以美国不支持这样的“公投”。
柯庆生说，台湾要做什么不做什么，美国既无能力亦无权力置喙，“但是，我们觉得有义务提出警告，“入联公投居心不良，而且可能非常危险”。
柯庆生说，“坏的政策不会因为包装在民主的旗帜中就变的比较好”。如果入联公投不回头，“我们期盼台湾理性、聪慧的选民会洞察空言，理性抉择，了解此一‘公投’不符他们的利益。因为这会在本质上伤害台湾的‘对外关系’”。
柯庆生进一步解释说，入联公投说得振振有词，其实会限制而非扩展台湾的国际空间。他说，如果台湾当局采取没有必要的挑衅行动，那些可能帮助台湾的国家也会对台湾敬而远之。柯庆生说，美国与台湾间的关系十分友好，但是我们不让台湾决定我们的立场。
对于近年来台湾地区领导人常说的“台湾独立是现状，应予捍卫”，柯庆生说，让我清楚表明：毫无疑问，美国不承认“台湾是独立国家”，我们也不接受“台湾独立”这种挑衅说法。因此，“对于这种说法，以及以台湾之名的‘入联公投’，我们都视为不必要的挑衅”。
柯庆生演讲稿全文：
Vice Minister Ko Cheng-heng, Dr. Su Chi, Rupert, other distinguished guests, I am delighted to be able to speak today at this important event. Many thanks to all of you for being here – especially our friends from Taiwan, who have taken time from busy schedules and traveled so far. I would also like to thank the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, which has established this conference as the premier annual venue for discussing Taiwan’s security. As the State Department’s representative, I will touch on broad issues in Taiwan security in my remarks this morning, leaving detailed questions of defense strategy and arms procurement to the military experts. My remarks represent the agreed views of the United States Government. I invite you to consider my comments in that light.
This conference is timely. In the year ahead, we will again celebrate Taiwan’s democracy, and we will also closely follow how Taiwan’s leaders navigate the often difficult circumstances in relations across the Taiwan Strait. Their actions will be a major factor in determining whether the interests of their people are protected; whether Taiwan will continue to flourish in an environment of peace and security; or whether all that Taiwan has achieved might be put at risk by cross-Strait tensions or, worse still, conflict.
For reasons that I will elaborate in a moment, the United States has an abiding interest in a stable and peaceful relationship across the Taiwan Strait in which Taiwan thrives. Anything that makes Taiwan stronger and safer is good for the United States, and, for obvious reasons, is also good for the people of Taiwan. Anything that places such peace and stability at risk runs directly against the interests of the United States. For these reasons, we look to Taiwan to adopt strategies toward cross-Strait relations that combine strength – both military and economic – with moderation. When we see policies that diverge from these goals, we owe it to ourselves and to the Taiwan people to speak out.
Origins of U.S. Interest
I would first like to address two fundamental questions: why does the United States care about Taiwan’s security, and what is the basis for our expression of views on this important subject? The answers to the first are straight-forward. As a Pacific power with global interests and obligations, the United States has a natural interest in peace throughout Asia. Because the Taiwan Strait is a potential flashpoint for conflict, the area demands our constant attention. Meanwhile, through our decades of close friendship with the people of Taiwan, we have acquired deep admiration for their achievements under difficult circumstances and a special concern for their democracy, freedom from coercion, and prosperity. A successful Taiwan is a beacon for East Asia and beyond. Finally, U.S. support for Taiwan is enshrined in U.S. domestic law in the Taiwan Relations Act. In short, strategic, moral, and legal requirements compel a continuous U.S. interest in Taiwan and its security.
The same arguments, in turn, give us a legitimate voice on issues touching on Taiwan security. Naturally, judgments about how to defend Taiwan rest ultimately with the people of Taiwan, as articulated through their democratic institutions. We respect that prerogative. At the same time, to defend our own interests, satisfy our legal obligations, and, indeed, support people whom we regard as old friends, we believe we are right to express our views, including our real concerns, regarding Taiwan’s security policies. Because Taiwan is a democracy, the Taiwan people will decide for themselves how to respond to the views expressed by their friends in the United States.
With that, I would like to speak today about Taiwan’s security in the broadest sense and about the factors that are critical to sustaining it. Everything I say here is based on a recognition of the growing PRC military threat to Taiwan posed by the fast-paced military build-up opposite Taiwan and by Beijing’s refusal to rule out the use of force against Taiwan. The United States has demonstrated its rejection of any coercion of Taiwan through both its defensive arms sales to Taipei and maintenance of our unilateral capability to respond to such coercion, if our President were so to choose. Actions speak louder than words, and no one on either side of the Strait has an excuse for being ignorant of U.S. expectations and determination to protect our own interests. At the same time, our resolute defense of these interests has benefited the region for decades, providing the indispensable conditions for stability in the Strait, a dramatic increase in prosperity on both sides, rich and growing cross-Strait connections, and a democratic transformation on Taiwan that is an inspiration to the world.
The Need for Taiwan’s Strength and Moderation
As I stated at the outset, the United States believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to the immediate and long-term security needs of the people of Taiwan. Anything less than strength and moderation leaves Taiwan vulnerable, endangers regional peace, and potentially threatens U.S. interests. Let me address these two fundamental elements in turn.
A Strong Taiwan
A strong Taiwan is, very simply, one that maintains the military capacity to withstand coercion for an extended period of time. To the extent Beijing knows it cannot subdue Taiwan swiftly -- before the international community would be able to react -- deterrence is reinforced. Taiwan’s prosperity and social stability are, of course, additional sources of strength, but the military dimension is indispensable. A Taiwan that can defend itself is a major factor for peace. A strong Taiwan can also negotiate with Beijing with greater confidence and thereby pursue more effectively durable, equitable arrangements for cross-Strait peace.
www.singtaonet.com
